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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
construed so as to sustain the gift wherever possible.2 1 Since the intention of the
grantor constitutes the controlling element in any construction problem,22 the
courts must first determine that intent and then ascertain whether it can be
carried out.
Three cases recently before the Court of Appeals2 3 presented substantially
the same problem of interpretation regarding such charitable bequests. These
cases involved bequests to foreign hospitals that had been nationalized after the
death of the testator but before fulfillment of the gifts. In each case, the Court
held (6-1) that such nationalization did not divest the gift.
Since the intent of the testator, to aid the sick poor of the district served by
the hospital, was clearly ascertainable from the will, it was only necessary for the
Court to determine whether such purpose was effectively defeated by national-
ization. Examination of the applicable nationalizing acts2 disclosed provisions
for a corporate Board of Directors to operate each hospital with the power to
accept endowments and administer them in accordance with their terms as far
as practicable. In view of such provisions, the fact that the nationalizing acts
vested technical title in a government minister was deemed immaterial. Likewise,
the fact that the bequests would benefit the nationalizing governments, by
ultimately reducing the cost of operating the hospitals, was deemed incidental to,
and not destructive of, testator's purpose to aid the sick poor.
Thus, the liberal view taken by the Court in these cases presents a clear
manifestation of the established policy of favoring charitable bequests.- On the
basis of the facts involved, there appears to be little danger of frustration of the
testator's purpose; hence, there has been no undue extension of the policy of
liberality.
Consfruction Of Wills
In the matter of interpretation of wills, the Court of Appeals appeared to
progress from liberal to strict as the term progressed.
21. In re Robinson's Will, 203 N.Y. 380, 96 N.E. 925 (1911); In re Cunning-
ham's Will, 206 N.Y. 601, 100 N.E. 437 (1912); Where a general charitable
purpose is clear, but the exact terms of the gift cannot be carried out, the gift
may nonetheless be sustained by invocation of the cy pres doctrine. N.Y. REAL
PROPERTY LAW §113; N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §12; In re Lyon, 280 N.Y. 391,
21 N.E.2d 365 (1939).
22. In re Hayes' Will, 263 N.Y. 219, 188 N.E. 716 (1934).
23. In re Ablett's Will, 3 N.Y.2d 261, 165 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1957); In re Perkin's
Will, 3 N.Y.2d 281, 165 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1937); In re Bishop's Will, 3 N.Y.2d 294,
165 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1957).
24. NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE ACT, 1946, 9&10 GEO. 6, c.81; NATIONAL HEALTE
SERVICE AT, 1947, 10&11 GEo. 6, c. 27 (Scotland).
25. See note 21 supra.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
In the case of In re Fabbri's Will,26 the disputed clause read:
Sixth: Upon the death of Edith, either before or after me, the principal
of the trust fund created for her benefit shall be distributed to and
among such issue of Teresa Clark, daughter of Edith, as I may designate
in writing.27
The testator died without making further designation with respect to the
remainder interest.
Since an overly literal reading of the last sentence of the clause would in
effect disinherit the claimants, the Court held this to be contrary to the dominant
purpose of the plan of distribution which it gleaned from the will itself and
circumstances surrounding the making of it. Furthermore, it would be contrary
to the presumption against intestacy, an inference of common experience that a
person undertaking to make a will intends, unless clearly indicated otherwise, to
dispose of his entire estate.28 Thus the Court construed the language to mean a
class gift to the children of Teresa Clark with a reservation of a right to prefer
certain of the children over others, and in the absence of such apportionment,
the residue to be divided equally.2 9
Three of the Court thought differently. Said Judge Desmond for the
minority, "Judicial reluctance to adjudge partial intestacy can have no effect here,
any more than our wish that the testator had made a later written designation so
as to leave a plan of distribution more symmetrical and to our minds more fair."30
These latter remarks proved to foreshadow two cases decided later in which
the respective claimants attempted to apply an argument of symmetry. New York
has long recognized the bequest by implication, 31 the most common example of
which is the gift to "B for life, and if B dies without issue, then to C." -3 2  B's
surviving issus may take by implication. A more elaborate gift by implication is
26. 2 N.Y.2d 236, 159 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1957).
27. Id. at 238, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
28. The presumption against intestacy is particularly strong in respect to
the disposition of a residuary estate. In re Hayes' Will, 263 N.Y. 219, 188 N.E.
716 (1934); Snyder v. Snyder, 182 App. Div. 65, 169 N.Y. Supp. 396 (2d Dep't
1918); In re McGowan's Will, 134 Misc. 409, 235 N.Y. Supp. 484 (Surr. Ct. 1929),
aff'd, 228 App. Div. 779, 239 N.Y. Supp. 688 (2d Dep't 1930), afi'd mnem., 254 N.Y.
513, 173 N.E. 844 (1930).
29. The Court, in the past, has been reluctant to find a class gift where
the language would lend itself to being interpreted as an individual gift.
Moffet v. Elmendorf, 152 N.Y. 475, 46 N.E. 845 (1897); cf. In re Bartlett's Will,
224 App. Div. 136, 80 N.Y.S.2d 375 (3d Dep't 1948).
30. 2 N.Y.2d at 245, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
31. Masterson v. Townshend, 123 N.Y. 458, 25 N.E. 928 (1890).
32. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §272 (1940); In re Latz's Estate, 95 N.Y.S.2d 584
(Surr. Ct. 1950).
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found in In re Selner's Estate,3 where the gift was made to the testator's wife
for life, unless she predecease him, in which event the gift was to go to testator's
children. The. wife survived the testator and it was- held that the sons received
the remainder after her life estate by implication.
It is clear, of course, that all such gifts are primarily dependent upon the
intent of the testator and it may be noted that presumption against intestacy will
be found utilized broadly whenever the gift is allowed even though such rules
are often held to be of little value generally in interpreting wills.
34
In both In re Englis' Will,3: and In re Slater's Will,30 life estates in trust
income were left to the respective widows of the testators, with remainders to the
tstators' children or their issue, but if the children should predecease the widows,
in each case the gift was to go to the claimants.
In the Englis3T case, the income from the trust was to go to the surviving
child should either die without issue after the death of the widow. No provision
was made for the contingency that actually happened, that is, both children dying
without issue after the widow. The Court found the contingent gift to the claim-
ants only incidental to the plan of the will, and the result of the intention
exhausted rather than inadvertent omission. "That is answer enough," said Judge
Desmond for a unanimous Court, "A. to the argument of the respondents in
this case that the presumption against intestacy is so strong that we should
conjure up a legacy by implication."38
In the Slater9 case, the "children were originally to share the corpus of the
trust after the death of the widow, but a codocil was appended to the will eight
years after its making giving the daughter only a life estate in the income of the
trust and in that instrument the contingent remainder to the claimants to take
effect on the death of the testator's wife was, for reasons not apparent in the
opinion, repeated. No provision was made for the contingency which actually
happened, the daughter dying without issue after the widow. While it seems
anomalous that the testator should be concerned over keeping the property out
of intestacy in the one instance so as to repeat the contingent gift and, out of
less than mere inadvertence, deprive the claimants of the property in the second
33. 261 App. Div. 618, 26 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dep't 1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 664,
39 N.E. 2d 287 (1941). See also, West v. Murphy, 197 N.C. 488, 149 S.E. 731
(1929); Renaker v. Tanner, 260 Ky. 281, 83 S.W.2d 54 (1935).
34. In re Hayes' Will, 263 N.Y. 219, 222, 188 N.E. 716, 717 (1934); Kern v.
Kern, 293 IlI. 238, 127 N.E. 396 (1920).
35. 2 N.Y.2d 395, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 39 (1957).
36. 3 N.Y.2d 109. 164 N.Y.S2d 393 (1957).
37. Supra, note 35.
38. Id. at 404, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
39. Supra, note 36.
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contingency, the Court rested its decision directly on the Englis case, and held for
intestacy.
It is interesting to note that the air of certainty added to the Fabbri decision
by the presumption against intestacy was entirely dispelled in the later cases. This
suggests that the facts of each case must be a priori sympathetic to the claimant
before the rule has any efficacy.
Date Of Commutation Of Annuity
Testatrix had during her lifetime created an inter vivos trust. She held a
life interest in the profits-with her children designated as the primary bene-
ficiaries. In lieu of a right retained in the trust agreement the settlor created
an annuity in her will for her husband to be paid out of the said trust. The
annuity being a lien on the trust, the beneficiaries contested the validity of the
said annuity and requested that if found valid it be commuted. The validity was
established in a previous decision as was the right to have it commuted. 40
However, this was not until fifteen years after the settlor's death. The Court in
In re Ferris' Trust4' was faced with the question as to the date the annuity should
be computed. Should the annuitant be paid his said annuity for the years up to
the date of the decision of the Court to direct the commutation and at this date
award the computed value, or should the date of the settlor's death be the date
of the computed value? The first alternative means a larger settlement for the-
annuitant because the mortality tables set a later age as the life expectancy as
one becomes older.
The majority of the Court were of the opinion that the date of the settlor's
death should represent the computed value. Unless otherwise provided, an
annunity runs from the date of the death of the testator with the first payment
due at the end of the first twelve-month period.42 The Court reasoned that the
commutation being a substitute for the annuity it should, if possible, be
computed from the same date. To alleviate some of the difference between the
amount he will receive and the amount he would have received if the later date
were used, the Court authorized the maximum interest on the computed value
for the years of litigation.
The dissent's opinion was that the annuitant should receive his annuity for
the years up to the time the Court decides the commutation should take place and
at this time direct the computed value. Their reasoning stems from the idea that
40. Application of Harris, 276 App. Div. 990, 96 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1st Dep't 1950),
afl'd, 302 N.Y. 752, 98 N.E.2d 884 (1951).
41. 3 N.Y.2d 70, 163 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1957).
42. Kearney v. Cruikshank, 117 N.Y. 95, 22 N.E. 580 (1889).
